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Executive Summary 
 
In this report, we present cost and coverage estimates of five different options for expanding 
health insurance in New York State.  For each of the five options, we estimate the following: 
 
• Increase in coverage due to the expansion (reduction in uninsured) 
• Crowd-out (the number of people with employer-sponsored or individual, non-group 
coverage that switch into public coverage) 
• Net cost to the New York State government (the additional amount that New York State 
would have to pay to finance the new enrollees) 
• Net change in statewide health spending (the total aggregate amount that would be spent 
on health care in the State less the amount that would have been spent without the 
expansion.  This includes costs to government, employers and individual out-of-pocket 
expenses).  
 
The first option we modeled was a single-payer program based on a proposal by the Physicians 
for a National Health Plan Program—New York Metro Chapter. The single payer program 
would replace all current insurers in New York with one, publicly financed system and provide 
comprehensive coverage to all residents of the State with no cost-sharing or deductibles.  We 
estimate that extending such coverage to all New York State residents (including the 2.6 million 
uninsured) would result in a net increase in overall health care spending of $5.8 billion primarily 
due to the increased generosity of coverage for those already insured as well as coverage of all 
the currently uninsured.  To provide this coverage, New York State would have to generate about 
$66.8 billion through taxes on individuals and employers.  The taxes would be offset by the 
redirection of current employer contributions as well as substantial reductions in individual out-
of-pocket payments, totaling approximately $61 billion. 
 
The second, third and fourth options are each “building block” proposals, which combine a series 
of incremental strategies for expansion. The first (“Building Block 1”) is based on the United 
Hospital Fund and The Commonwealth Fund’s “A Blueprint for Universal Health Insurance 
Coverage in New York.” The second variation (“Building Block 2”) is a slightly more generous 
version of the first. The third variation (“Building Block 3”) is based on the Community Service 
Society’s “Cornerstone for Coverage” plan.  Building Block 1 and Building Block 2 combine a 
series of public program expansions with an individual buy-in and an option of an individual 
mandate.  Building Block 3 provides universal access to public health insurance through 
expansion of the State’s Family Health Plus and Child Health Plus programs and implementation 
of a Family Health Plus Employer Buy-In.   
 
Without a mandate, the first variation would cover 500,000 uninsured with an additional 300,000 
who would switch from private to public coverage (crowd-out) at a cost to the government of 
New York State of $1.0 billion.  With a mandate, this first proposal would cover a total of 2.1 
million uninsured persons at a government cost of $4.0 billion.  The second variation would 
cover 700,000 uninsured and an additional 400,000 of those who previously held private 
coverage at a cost of $1.9 billion to New York State.  Combining this second variation with an 
individual mandate would cover a total of 2.3 million uninsured at a cost to New York State of 
$5.2 billion.  The third variation would cover 1.0 million uninsured, while 500,000 would switch 
from private to public coverage at a cost to New York State of $3.6 billion.   With a mandate, 
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overall health spending in New York State under the first variation would increase by 
approximately $5.0 billion and increase by $5.2 billion under the second variation.  Under the 
third variation, overall health spending in New York State would increase by approximately $1.6 
billion.   
 
The last option we modeled was a market-oriented option, with elements based on the Manhattan 
Institute’s “Rx NY” proposal. Under the plan, approximately 100,000 – 130,000 uninsured 
persons would gain coverage at a cost to New York State of $130 million and an additional cost 
to the federal government of $580 million.  Under this option, overall health care spending in 
New York State would increase by approximately $280 – $440 million. 
 
Table I: 
Estimated Cost and Coverage Impacts for All Five Options* 
 
Total 
Covered 
Through 
Plan 
(Thousands) 
Reduction in 
Number 
Uninsured 
(Thousands) 
Crowd-Out 
of Private 
Insurance 
(Thousands) 
Remaining 
Uninsured 
(Thousands) 
Net 
Additional 
State Gov’t 
Costc 
(Millions) 
Net 
Increase in 
Health 
Spendingd 
( Millions) 
Single Payer 
19,000b 2,600  11,300 0 $66,800 $5,800 
Building Block Variation 1  
Without Mandate 
800 500  300 2,100 $1,000 $900 
With Mandate 
2,400 2,100 300 500 $4,000 $5,000 
Building Block Variation 2  
Without Mandate 
1,100 700 400 1,900 $1,900 $1,000 
With Mandate 
2,700 2,300 400 300 $5,200 $5,200 
Building Block Variation 3 
1,500 1,000 500 1,600 $3,600 $1,600 
Market-Oriented 
100-130 100-130 0 2,500 $130 $280-$440 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding. 
a
 Total covered through plan represents all the individuals who will enroll in some form of insurance as a result of 
enacting this plan.  This includes the uninsured who become newly insured as well as individuals already covered by 
private insurance (employer or individual) and would now switch to this new coverage (crowd-out).   
b
 The single payer system replaces all existing insurance programs.   Therefore, all people with private insurance 
would be covered under single payer.   In addition, columns 2 and 3 do not sum to column 1 because the “total 
covered through plan” also includes all people previously on public insurance (Medicare, Medicaid, etc.) now part 
of the single payer plan.   
c The net additional government cost represents the additional amount of money the New York State government 
will have to contribute in order to finance the plan.   
d
 The net increase in health spending represents the change in overall health spending that will result from the 
enactment of the plan.  It is calculated as the sum of all health expenditures (government, private, and out-of-pocket 
and administration) after the plan is enacted minus current level of health expenditures.   Most of this increase is 
spending comes from individuals who were previously uninsured and took up either private or public coverage and 
thus would now have greater health spending.
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Our analysis shows that no single approach clearly dominates the others.  We conclude that any 
insurance expansion in New York State will involve tradeoffs of numbers covered, costs, 
generosity and comprehensiveness of coverage.  By providing a reference of the broad 
implications and tradeoffs of the various reform options and philosophies, we hope our findings 
will stimulate debate and discussion on health insurance expansions among New York State 
policymakers and stakeholders.   
 
Data and Methods in Brief 
 
For each proposal, we estimate the number of people in New York State eligible for the 
expansions by categories defined by age, poverty level, and insurance status.  We then apply a 
take-up rate for each program to the aggregate population within each cell.  (For example, for a 
Medicaid expansion, we apply a Medicaid take-up rate to the total number of uninsured adults 
with incomes below 200% FPL).   
 
There are several differences between our approach and a microsimulation model, such as those 
used by the Urban Institute and the Lewin Group.  In a microsimulation model, program 
outcomes are modeled based on the projected behavior of individuals.  Most microsimulation 
models also characterize the behavior of firms composed of these individuals.  Because behavior 
is modeled at the individual level, microsimulation models can provide more refined estimates of 
firm dropping and take-up behavior and individual program responses than we can provide using 
our cell-based model.  Microsimulation models can provide distributions of costs across a wide 
range of population groups.  Our model is only able to distinguish between private and public 
costs.  Finally, our model is calibrated to 2004, while microsimulation models forecast future 
health care costs.  The resulting estimates are intended to provide a framework for discussion of 
factors that might affect the success of reform in New York State and provoke discussion around 
model parameters and their applicability in this context. 
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Introduction  
 
In this report, we provide the results for the second phase of our project consisting of basic 
modeling of five health reform options for New York State.  The reform options selected were 
based on findings from our earlier analysis1 as well as input from the New York State Health 
Foundation’s Coverage Consortium. We modeled a single-payer proposal, three variations of 
“building block” or incremental reforms, including the Community Service Society “Cornerstone 
for Coverage” plan,2 and a plan based on the Manhattan Institute’s “Rx NY” proposal.3  Our 
analysis employs a simple model to provide rough estimates of the likely costs and consequences 
of these expansion proposals.  These basic results are intended to provide a framework for 
discussion of factors that might affect the success of reform in New York State and provoke 
further discussion around model parameters and their applicability.  Readers should be aware 
that our findings may differ from the more detailed and precise microsimulation modeling 
currently being undertaken by the Urban Institute under a contract with New York State. 4  All of 
our estimates refer to what spending and coverage would have been in 2004 had these proposals 
been enacted at that time.  They are not intended to be a forecast of future costs.   Our simple 
model does not produce estimates of the distribution of cost across various stakeholders beyond 
government. 
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Summary of Proposals  
 
Single Payer 
 
The single-payer or “Medicare-for-All” proposal we modeled was based on a proposal by the 
Physicians for a National Health Plan Program—New York Metro Chapter.5   This reform option 
would replace all existing insurance in New York—including private insurance, Medicaid, 
Medicare, etc.—with a single, publicly financed insurance system.  In our models we assume 
that the Federal government would maintain its current effort by providing funding equivalent to 
Medicare, the federal share of Medicaid, and other federal programs such as those provided by 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and federally qualified Community Health Centers.  
The program would provide a comprehensive benefits package to all residents of New York 
State, including all hospital inpatient and outpatient services, physician and clinical, dental, 
emergency room, durable medical equipment, home health care, prescription drugs, and other 
professional services (i.e. office-based visits to non-physicians).  The program would not include 
nursing home care, non-durable medical equipment, and other personal health care services (such 
as housekeeping).  Under such a program, all premium and cost-sharing expenses, including all 
co-payments and deductibles, would be eliminated for individuals.   The program would be 
financed entirely through funds currently being spent on government health programs, including 
Medicaid, and through additional taxes, including the recapture of current employer and 
individual contributions towards health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket payments.       
.   
Building Block 1 and Building Block 2   
 
The first two variations of the “building-block” approach combine a series of incremental health 
insurance expansion proposals with the option of an individual mandate.  The program is 
designed to increase enrollment in public programs and make individual coverage more 
affordable for those who do not qualify for government-sponsored insurance.  The second 
version of this approach has higher eligibility benefits and more generous subsidies.  Both 
versions were modeled with and without an individual mandate, which would require all 
uninsured residents of New York State to purchase some form of health insurance.  
 
Insuring Children First (Expansion of Child Health Plus):  This element would increase 
eligibility for New York State’s Child Health Plus (S-CHIP) program from 250% of the federal 
poverty level to 400%.  It should be noted that while this reform option did not exist in 2004, it is 
currently being phased-in in New York State. 
 
Expansion of Family Health Plus for Childless Adults:  This element would increase eligibility 
for fully subsidized Family Health Plus for childless adults from its current level of 100% FPL to 
150% FPL.  We also modeled a second variation, which expands Family Health Plus eligibility 
for all adults (childless adults and parents) to 200% of the federal poverty level.   
 
Implementation of a Family Health Plus (Medicaid) Buy-In:  This measure would allow all 
adults whose incomes are too high to qualify for the above fully-subsidized Family Health Plus 
or Medicaid coverage to purchase coverage through Family Health Plus with premium subsidies 
offered on a sliding scale.  In the first version, the premiums would be subsidized on a sliding-
scale basis for those between 150% and 300% FPL.  Adults whose incomes are above this level 
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could purchase the coverage at the full premium.  In the second variation, the buy-in would apply 
to adults with incomes between 200% and 400% of the federal poverty level.  The premium 
subsidies are listed in Table 2. 
 
Insurance Connector:  An insurance connector in New York State would serve as a new 
purchasing entity that would allow residents to select between various non-group (individual) 
coverage plans.   
 
Table II:  Summary of Building Block 1 and Building Block 2 
 
 Variation 1 Variation 2 
Public Program Expansion Child Health Plus to 400% of 
the Federal Poverty Level 
 
Family Health Plus for 
Childless Adults to 150% of 
the Federal Poverty Level 
Child Health Plus to 400% of 
the Federal Poverty Level 
 
Family Health Plus for all 
adults to 200% of the Federal 
Poverty Level 
Family Health Plus Buy-In Premium Subsidies for Adults 
between 150% and 300% of 
the Federal Poverty Level: 
 
151 – 200% FPL:  80%  
201 – 250% FPL:  65%  
251 – 275% FPL:  50%  
276 – 300% FPL:  25%  
Premium Subsidies for Adults 
between 200% and 400% of 
the Federal Poverty Level 
 
201 – 250% FPL:  80%  
251 – 300% FPL:  60%  
301 – 400% FPL:  40%  
Insurance Connector 5% decrease in non-group 
premiums 
5% decrease in non-group 
premiums 
Individual Mandate Option Option 
 
 
Building Block 3 
 
The third variation of the building block plan, based on the Cornerstone plan,6 proposed by the 
Community Service Society (CSS) of New York, would provide universal access to health 
insurance for residents of New York State.  It builds on New York’s current public programs – 
Family Health Plus and Child Health Plus – by expanding eligibility to all income levels.  The 
program would provide comprehensive benefits comparable to those of Family Health 
Plus/Medicaid for adults and Child Health Plus for children.  It would allow children and adults 
with household incomes below 160% of the federal poverty level to enroll with a full subsidy.  
Populations at higher income levels, up to 600%, would pay premiums on a sliding scale as a 
percentage of household income.  The program would also allow higher income individuals as 
well as employers to buy into the program.7  The premium distribution used in our analysis for 
individuals between 160%-600% of FPL was based on the CSS proposal as follows: 
 
Individual Coverage: 
0 – 160% FPL:  0% (Free) 
161 – 225% FPL:   1.4% 
226 – 250% FPL:  1.6% 
251 – 300% FPL:  2.4% 
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301 – 350% FPL:  2.8% 
351 – 400% FPL:  3.5% 
401 – 500% FPL:  4.3% 
501 – 600% FPL:  4.7% 
>600% FPL:  Full Premium 
 
Market-Based Reform 
 
We based our analysis of a market-oriented health reform proposal for New York State on the 
Manhattan Institute’s Empire Center for New York State’s “Rx NY.”8  The elements of the 
proposal modeled include:   
 
Repeal Community Rating for the Non-Group Market: New York State currently employs pure 
community rating, which requires that insurers set the same premiums for all individuals, 
regardless of age and health status.  We modeled the age/health status coverage shifts in the non-
group market that would result from repealing these laws. 
 
Eliminate Individual State Benefit Mandates:  New York State requires that certain health 
benefits be covered in some form by all health policies regulated by the State.  We modeled the 
coverage effects of eliminating all of New York State’s benefit service mandates for the 
individual market.  The Rx NY proposal recommends eliminating only needless mandates rather 
than all of them, however our regression results indicate that insurance costs attributed to such 
mandates have little effect on non-group coverage (see technical appendix).  We hence modeled 
the coverage effects of eliminating all benefit mandates for our analysis. 
 
Establish a High-Risk Pool:  We modeled the effects of establishing a high-risk pool in New 
York State to cover high-cost individuals who would not otherwise obtain insurance.  The 
original proposal specified that funding from the pool would be available through a per-person 
assessment on anybody with private insurance.  However, ERISA prevents any such tax 
assessment on large employers.  We model the coverage shifts that would result from charging 
the tax for the high- risk pool only to individuals in the non-group and small group market.  
 
Establish Section 125 Cafeteria Plans:  A Section 125 Plan, or a cafeteria plan, is a benefit 
offered by employers that allows employees to purchase health insurance on a pre-tax basis.  We 
modeled the cost and coverage effects of requiring all employers in New York State to offer 
these plans to their employees.   
 
Short-Term / Temporary Insurance Plans:  Several insurance companies offer “short-term 
medical” plans to individuals who require health coverage for between three months and a year.  
These plans are available in forty-six states, but are not legal in New York State.  We estimated 
the coverage effects of establishing such plans in New York.  
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Table III:  Summary of Five Options to Increase Health Insurance in New York State 
 
Reform Eligible Population Description 
Single Payer 
 
Entire New York State population.  • A publicly financed program 
that replaces all existing 
sources of health insurance, 
including Medicare. 
• Comprehensive benefit 
package to all residents, 
excluding nursing home care, 
non-durable medical 
equipment and ‘other personal 
health care’ services.  
• No co-payments or 
deductibles.  
Building Block Variation 1 
Public Program Expansion All childless adults with 
household incomes below 150% 
FPL. 
 
All children under the age of 19 in 
households with incomes below 
400% FPL. 
• Expands eligibility limits of 
Family Health Plus to 150% 
FPL. 
• Expands eligibility of Child 
Health Plus to 400% FPL. 
Family Health Plus Buy-In Adults with incomes greater than 
150% FPL. 
• Individual adults with 
incomes greater than 150% 
FPL could purchase coverage 
in Family Health Plus. 
• Premium subsidies would be 
distributed on a sliding scale 
basis. 
• Adults can buy in at full 
premium if incomes are above 
300% FPL. 
Insurance Connector All uninsured individuals and 
those with non-group insurance 
would be eligible for premium 
reduction through non-group 
market. 
• Establishes a purchasing 
mechanism that allows 
individuals to select from 
various plans at reduced rates. 
Individual Mandate All remaining uninsured residents 
of New York State after the public 
program expansions, buy-in and 
connector are implemented. 
• Would require remaining 
uninsured individuals to 
purchase available insurance. 
Building Block Variation 2 
Public Program Expansion All adult (childless and parents) 
residents with household incomes 
below 200% FPL. 
 
All children under the age of 19 in 
households with incomes below 
400% FPL. 
 
• Expands eligibility limits of 
Family Health Plus to 200% 
FPL. 
• Expands eligibility limits of 
Child Health Plus to 400% 
FPL. 
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Reform Eligible Population Description 
Family Health Plus Buy-In Adult residents with incomes 
greater than 200% FPL. 
• Adults with incomes greater 
than 200% FPL can purchase 
coverage in Family Health 
Plus. 
• Premium subsidies distributed 
on sliding scale basis. 
• Adults can buy in at full 
premium if incomes are above 
400% FPL. 
Insurance Connector See Variation #1 • See Variation #1 
Individual Mandate See Variation #1 • See Variation #1 
Building Block Variation 3 
Public Program Expansion All child and adult residents 
would be given universal access to 
the program. 
• Expands eligibility limits of 
Family Health Plus and Child 
Health Plus programs to all 
income levels to achieve 
universal access to coverage. 
• Premiums assigned by 
household income as a 
percentage of poverty level. 
Employer Buy-In  Full-time workers who have 
access to public coverage. 
• Allows employers to buy 
access to public insurance 
coverage for their employees. 
• Employees pay the same share 
as they would for individual 
coverage in the program. 
• Employers pay remainder of 
the full premium up to 70%. 
• New York State government 
pays the remainder, if any. 
Market-Based 
Easing Market Regulation Uninsured individuals and those in 
the non-group market would be 
affected by the measure. 
• Eliminates New York State’s 
community rating laws in the 
non-group market. 
• Eliminates New York State’s 
mandated benefits in the non-
group market. 
Establish a High-Risk Pool All “medically uninsurable” 
individuals without access to 
public or employer-sponsored 
insurance.   
 
Individuals in the small group and 
non-group market.  
• Establishes pool for 
traditionally uninsurable 
individuals. 
• The small group and non-
group population would be 
taxed to finance the cost of the 
pool. 
Section 125 Plans All working individuals (working 
with ESI, working uninsured with 
offer of ESI, working uninsured 
without an offer of ESI). 
• Allows individuals to 
purchase health insurance on a 
pretax basis. 
Short Term / Temporary 
Insurance Plans 
Uninsured individuals and those in 
the non-group market. 
• Allows people to purchase 
short term (3-12 months) 
medical coverage. 
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Data and Methods in Briefa 
 
We used a simple cell-based modeling approach. The cells are based on the population in New 
York State stratified by age, poverty level, and insurance status, obtained from the Census 
Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Study Supplement of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS).9  In order to increase the precision of our estimates, we pooled CPS data for New York 
State for 2004-2006.  With this increased sample size, we were able to more precisely estimate 
sub-populations by age and primary insurance coverage and further stratify by additional factors 
that were necessary for the proposals, including work status, employer size, industry, etc.   
 
We obtained estimates of national per capita health expenditures stratified by age, gender and 
type of service using the 2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component 
(MEPS-HC).10   To obtain New York State health expenditure estimates that conform to the 
estimates from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Service’s (CMS) National Health 
Accounts,11 we adjusted the MEPS data using aggregate New York State level expenditure data 
from CMS.  As 2004 is the most recent year that such CMS data is available, our estimates 
should be interpreted as the effect of each health reform option on New York State costs and 
coverage had each proposal been in full effect in 2004.  Using these baseline data, we then 
calculated the effects of each proposal on coverage and expenditures for the State by population 
(age, insurance coverage, poverty level, etc.).   In addition, we applied our assumptions and 
parameters uniformly to each applicable proposal so that most variations in the effects can be 
attributed to the nature of the proposal.  We should also note that our coverage outcome was 
simply being insured and did not examine the comprehensiveness of coverage.  Some reform 
options, such as single payer, would provide very comprehensive coverage while others, such as 
the elimination of mandates under the market-based proposal, would reduce the generosity of 
coverage available.  
 
Key Assumptions 
Although many of the parameters that we employ in our analysis have been explored extensively 
in prior studies, findings from prior studies conflict.  As an example, depending on the modeler, 
price elasticity estimates can vary from -0.1 to -0.6.  This means that a 10% reduction in the cost 
of insurance would lead to between a 1 and 6% increase in coverage.12  In addition, for some of 
the proposals, we had to make assumptions for specific elements for which there exists limited 
data, such as take-up of coverage through short-term/temporary health insurance plans.  All of 
our assumptions are described in our technical appendix. Below we highlight some of the most 
salient in modeling the five options: 
 
Assumptions for All Proposals 
• A 10% reduction in the price of insurance would increase the number of insured by about 3% 
(varies by income) 
• Increases in utilization from covering any proportion of the uninsured can be met by existing 
provider supply 
• Increases in utilization from more generous benefits can be met by existing provider supply 
                                                 
a
 A detailed description of all the methods used to arrive at these results, along with a list of all the parameters used 
and their sources can be found in the technical appendix. 
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• Any reduction in employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) – through a single payer or crowd-out 
– will generate a corresponding increase in taxes collected on wages.  We assume that 
average employee contributions will adjust  
 
Assumptions for Single Payer 
• Automatic coverage under a zero-premium single payer plan would lead to the enrollment of 
all uninsured people in New York State 
• Any administrative cost savings in the single payer plan would be entirely captured through 
reduced provider payments 
• Uncompensated care cost payments could be withdrawn under single payer coverage 
 
Assumptions for Public Programs 
• Increasing eligibility of public programs to higher incomes would increase take-up in 
uninsured, employer-sponsored insurance and individual (non-group) populations 
• Under zero premium voluntary public coverage, no more than 90% of the eligible uninsured 
would enroll. 
• Uncompensated care cost payments could not be withdrawn under incremental reforms 
• If 2/3 of a given population group enrolls in coverage voluntarily, a mandate could compel 
75% of these remaining uninsured to enroll 
• An insurance connector could reduce administrative costs by 5% 
• Providers would take any number of additional FHP and CHP enrollees at prevailing 
payment rates 
• For low income uninsured people not eligible for public programs, the primary barrier to 
health insurance is cost.  For higher income uninsured people, in addition to cost, other un-
modeled factors (such as expected duration of joblessness) also matter. 
• Most people who now purchase non-group coverage would switch to a public plan if it were 
less expensive and comprehensive, but 20% would stick with private coverage 
• People who already hold ESI would only be about 1/3 as likely as similar uninsured people to 
voluntarily switch to a new insurance product 
• Employers of higher wage workers would be less responsive to the availability of expanded 
public insurance programs than would employers of lower wage workers 
• Only small firms with fewer than 10 employees would drop coverage if new public coverage 
were available (unless an employer buy-in were implemented), though some employees 
would switch to public coverage 
• In plans with an individual buy-in, individuals compare their current share of the insurance 
premium to the new public premium; in plans containing an employer buy-in, the full ESI 
premium is compared to the combined employee and employer payments under the public 
program. 
 
Assumptions for Market-Based Proposals 
• 75% of firms that do not now do so would comply with a mandate to offer Section 125 
cafeteria plans 
• The elimination of community rating and the substitution of community rating with high-risk 
pools are two different strategies that could not happen simultaneously 
 
 
 
 Analysis of Five Health Insurance Expansion Options for New York State  
 
14 
Results 
 
Our baseline scenario was that in 2004 there were 19.0 million people living in New York State 
of whom 16.4 million were insured and 2.6 million were uninsured.  Of the insured, 11.0 million 
were covered by employer-sponsored insurance, 0.1 million by individual, non-group coverage 
and 5.3 million by public coverage (Medicare, Medicaid and/or SCHIP).   Total health 
expenditures for New York State in 2004 were $134 billion (includes all services and insurer 
administration).  Total health expenditures excluding nursing home care, non-durable medical 
equipment, and other personal health care expenditures came to be $113 billion.  Under these 
baseline assumptions, had the following alternative coverage proposals been in effect in 2004, 
the changes to our baseline assumptions would be as follows:   
 
Table IV: 
Estimated Cost and Coverage Impacts for All Five Options* 
 
Total 
Covered 
Through 
Plana 
(Thousands) 
Reduction in 
Number 
Uninsured 
(Thousands) 
Crowd-Out 
of  Private 
Insurance 
(Thousands) 
Remaining 
Uninsured 
(Thousands) 
Net 
Additional 
State Gov’t 
Costc 
(Millions) 
Net 
Increase in 
Health 
Spendingd 
( Millions) 
Single Payer 
19,000b 2,600  11,300 0 $66,800 $5,800 
Building Block Variation 1  
Without Mandate 
800 500  300 2,100 $1,000 $900 
With Mandate 
2,400 2,100 300 500 $4,000 $5,000 
Building Block Variation 2  
Without Mandate 
1,100 700 400 1,900 $1,900 $1,000 
With Mandate 
2,700 2,300 400 300 $5,200 $5,200 
Building Block Variation 3 
1,500 1,000 500 1,600 $3,600 $1,600 
Market-Oriented 
100-130 100-130 0 2,500 $130 $280-$440 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding. 
a
 Total covered through plan represents all the individuals who will enroll in some form of insurance as a result of 
enacting this plan.  This includes the uninsured who become newly insured as well as individuals already covered by 
private insurance (employer or individual) and would now switch to this new coverage (crowd out).   
b
 The single payer system replaces all existing insurance programs.   Therefore, all people with private insurance 
would be covered under single payer.   In addition, columns 2 and 3 do not sum to column 1 because the “total 
covered through plan” also includes all people previously on public insurance (Medicare, Medicaid, etc.) now part 
of the single plan.   
c The net additional government cost represents the additional amount of money the New York State government 
will have to contribute in order to finance the plan.   
d
 The net increase in health spending represents the change in overall health spending that will result from the 
enactment of the plan.  It is calculated as the sum of all health expenditures (government, private, and out-of-pocket 
and administration) after the plan is enacted minus current level of health expenditures.    
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Single Payer Plan 
 
A single payer program would automatically cover all New Yorkers and no resident of the State 
would be excluded from coverage.  It would provide comprehensive benefits and eliminate all 
cost sharing for all New Yorkers, including the elimination of cost sharing for those previously 
insured through public or private coverage.  Excluded from coverage would be nursing home 
care, non-durable medical equipment, and ‘other personal health care’.  Excluding these costs, 
we estimate baseline total health expenditures in New York State of $113 billion. Under this 
program, New York State would see an increase in utilization of health care services by the 
previously uninsured population, which we estimate at approximately $7.8 billion.  Given the 
elimination of cost-sharing, we also predict a substantial increase in utilization among both the 
privately insured and among the Medicare population that currently do not hold supplemental 
insurance.  These increases would be about $9.8 billion for those now privately insured and $1.6 
billion for Medicare beneficiaries.   
 
Offsetting this $19.2 billion increase in health expenditures would be reductions in 
administrative costs and uncompensated care costs.  We estimate a reduction in insurance 
administrative costs of $3.6 billion.  The provider administrative savings would amount to $4.3 
billion for hospitals and $2.5 billion for physicians.  Total administrative savings under the single 
payer system would be approximately $10.4 billion.  We estimated total uncompensated care 
cost savings in New York State to be approximately $3.0 billion.  With these total savings of 
$13.4 billion, overall, there would be a net increase in health spending in New York State of 
about $5.8 billion.  
 
The outlays for the State government under this program would be $118.8 billion for health care 
costs and program administration.  Offsetting these costs would be payments under maintenance 
of federal effort for New York State health expenditures, which would be transferred to New 
York State once the program is established.  We assume that people who previously held 
employer-sponsored coverage would receive higher wages in lieu of these benefits.  These wages 
would be subject to a state tax on wages equivalent to the average state marginal tax rate on the 
average employer share of the New York State insurance premium.  This would offset the total 
cost of the single payer program by approximately $1.7 billion.  Combining these offsets, the net 
increase in expenditures for the New York State government for the single-payer program would 
be approximately $66.8 billion.  These new outlays would need to be financed through new taxes 
on employers and individuals.  Note, however, that employers would no longer need to provide 
insurance for employees under single payer and individual out-of-pocket costs would be 
substantially reduced as there would no longer be any co-payments or deductibles for services 
covered under the single payer. These employer and individual savings amount to approximately 
$61 billion.  Thus, the increase in New York State spending of $66.8 billion could be offset, in 
large part, by recapturing individual and employer savings.    
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Table V:  Change in New York State Health Spending Under a Single Payer Plan* 
 
 Change in Health 
Spending 
(Millions) 
Baseline Health Spending (without nursing home care, non-
durable medical equipment, and ‘other personal health care’) 
$113,000 
Increase in Utilization 
Uninsured 7,800 
Privately Insured 9,800 
Medicare w/out Supplemental Insurance 1,600 
Spending Offsets 
Insurer Administration (3,600) 
Hospital Administration (4,300) 
Physician Administration (2,500) 
Uncompensated Care Reduction (3,000) 
Change in Statewide Health Spending 
Net Change 5,800 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding.  
 
Table VI:  Additional Government Costs of a Single-Payer Plan in New York State* 
 
 Cost (Millions) 
Payments for Personal Health Care $122,500 
Program Administration 6,100 
Reduction in Provider Administrative Costs and 
Uncompensated Care 
(9,900) 
Total Costs 118,800 
Current Government Expenditures (Transfers) 
Medicare (22,700) 
Medicaid 
   Federal 
   State 
(24,200) 
(12,800) 
(11,400) 
Other Government Expenditures (Veterans Administration, 
Other Federal Sources, Other State and Local Sources, 
Worker’s Compensation, Other Public) 
   Federal 
   State 
(3,300) 
 
 
(2,800) 
(500) 
Taxes from Increased Wages  (1,700) 
Net Government Costs 
Total 66,800 
Note:  A substantial portion of the net government cost would be offset by the 
recapture of employer and individual spending, totaling approximately $61 billion. 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding.  
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Building Block Plans 
 
Variation 1:  The building block proposals would increase insurance options for those currently 
uninsured and would cause some of those currently insured through private coverage to switch 
coverage to public programs (known as crowd-out).         
 
We estimate that the plan component of expanding the Child Health Plus program for all 
children below 400% of the federal poverty level would insure an additional 50,000 previously 
uninsured children (as noted above New York State has recently implemented this SCHIP 
expansion).  An additional 200,000 children who previously had coverage through their parents’ 
employer and another 7,000 who previously had non-group coverage would transfer into the 
program.  The net government cost for these new enrollees would be $300 million.    
 
Expanding Family Health Plus for childless adults below 150% of the federal poverty level 
would cover 80,000 uninsured adults.  We estimate the crowd-out for this expansion would be 
approximately 20,000 who previously had employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) and 6,000 who 
previously had non-group coverage.  The net government cost would be $400 million. 
 
We estimate that implementing a Family Health Plus Buy-In that offers premium subsidies for 
adults between 150 and 300% of the federal poverty level would reduce the uninsured by 
400,000 and another 50,000 with non-group coverage and 20,000 with ESI would switch into the 
program.  The total government cost under the buy-in for covering these 500,000 enrollees 
would be $400 million.   
 
Implementation of an insurance connector would reduce premiums in the non-group market and 
increase coverage by approximately 1,000 individuals. 
 
Overall under these expansions an additional 500,000 persons would gain coverage and another 
300,000 would switch from private to public coverage at a total New York State government cost 
of $1 billion.  If this variation also included an individual mandate, an additional 1.6 million 
uninsured would take up coverage with whichever insurance source was available to them at the 
lowest price.  This would increase government costs by $3.0 billion.  The New York State 
government would realize some savings from increased taxes on wages for those who had 
employer-sponsored coverage and switched to one of the public programs, totaling 
approximately $40 million.  Overall, Variation 1 combined with an individual mandate would 
newly cover 2.1 million people and 300,000 would switch from private to public coverage at a 
New York State government cost of $4.0 billion.   
 
To estimate the net change in overall health care expenditures under this variation of the 
“building block” plan we subtracted the affected populations’ health expenditures under the 
current system from the total spending that people who take up coverage would have under this 
plan.   As shown in Table IX, we found that under this variation, New York State would see a net 
increase in total health spending of $5.0 billion generated primarily by new health spending for 
the previously uninsured who take up coverage under the mandate.    
 
Variation 2:  Under a slightly more generous Building Block proposal, we estimate that without 
an individual mandate, 700,000 uninsured would grain coverage and 400,000 would switch from 
private to public coverage.  The government cost for these 1.1 million people would be 
approximately $1.9 billion.  If combined with an individual mandate, overall 2.3 million 
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uninsured would gain coverage and 400,000 would switch from private to public coverage at a 
government cost of $5.2 billion.  The New York State government would see small savings in 
the form of increased wage taxes on individuals who switched from private to public coverage, 
totaling approximately $50 million.  Under this variation, total healthcare spending in New York 
State would increase by $5.2 billion. 
 
Table VII:  Costs and Coverage under the Building Block Plans 
Variation 1* 
 
 Total 
Covered 
Through 
Plan 
Reduction 
in 
Uninsured 
Previously 
with ESI 
Previously 
with Non-
Group 
Government 
Costs for New 
Enrollees 
(Millions) 
Child Health Plus Expansion (Children <19 to 400% FPL) 
Insured 300,000 50,000 200,000 7,000 $300 
Family Health Plus Expansion (Childless Adults >18 to 150% FPL) 
Insured 100,000 80,000 20,000 6,000 400 
Family Health Plus Buy-In 
Insured 500,000 400,000 20,000 50,000 400 
Insurance Connector 
Insured 1,000 1,000 0 0 0 
With Individual Mandate  
Insured 1,600,000 1,600,000 0 0 3,000 
Taxes from Increased Wages 
 (40) 
Total 
Insured 2,400,000 2,100,000 200,000 70,000 4,000 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding. 
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Table VIII:  Costs and Coverage under the Building Block Plans 
Variation 2* 
 
 Total 
Covered 
Through 
Plan 
Reduction 
in 
Uninsured 
Previously 
with ESI 
Previously 
with Non-
Group 
Government 
Costs for New 
Enrollees 
(Millions) 
Child Health Plus Expansion (Children <19 to 400% FPL) 
Insured 300,000 50,000 200,000 7,000 $300 
Family Health Plus Expansion (All Adults >18 to 200% FPL) 
Insured 300,000 200,000 100,000 10,000 1,200 
Family Health Plus Buy-In  
Insured 500,000 400,000 30,000 40,000 500 
Insurance Connector 
Insured 1,000 1,000 0 0  
With Individual Mandate  
Insured 1,600,000 1,600,000 0 0 3,400 
Taxes from Increased Wages 
 (50) 
Total  
Insured 2,700,000 2,300,000 300,000 70,000 5,200 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding. 
 
Table IX:  Change in Health Spending Under the Building Block Plans 
Variations 1 and 2* 
 
 Change in 
Health 
Spending 
(Millions) 
Variation 1 
Child Health Plus $(200)a 
Family Health Plus 200 
Family Health Plus Buy-In 1,000 
Insurance Connector 3 
Mandate 4,000 
Net Change in Health Spending 5,000 
Variation 2 
Child Health Plus $(200)a 
Family Health Plus 400 
Family Health Plus Buy-In 900 
Insurance Connector 3 
Mandate 4,100 
Net Change in Health Spending 5,200 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding. 
a  Expansion of Child Health Plus to 400% FPL would generate a net decrease in 
spending due to a large population of children switching from private to public 
coverage with its reduced average spending.   
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Variation 3:  The third variation of the Building Block proposals would expand coverage by 
increasing enrollment eligibility for public coverage to all income levels.  The relatively higher 
income eligibility levels and the employer buy-in element would also lead to greater take up 
among the privately insured. We estimate that the plan would reduce the number uninsured by 
1.0 million.  In addition, approximately 100,000 individuals who previously had non-group 
coverage and 400,000 who previously had employer coverage would switch to public coverage.  
The total costs to New York State to cover these 1.5 million persons would be $3.6 billion.  
Under this plan, total health spending would increase by much less—only approximately $1.6 
billion—because crowd-out would lead people to drop private coverage in favor of less costly 
coverage under the public planb.   
 
 
Table X: 
 Cost and Coverage under the Building Block Plans 
Variation 3* 
 
Income 
Range 
Total 
Covered 
Through 
Plan 
Reduction in 
Uninsured 
 
Previously 
Non-Group 
 
Previously 
ESI 
 
Total New 
York State 
Costs 
(Millions) 
 
Building Block 3 Expansion 
0 to 160% 600,000 300,000 40,000 200,000 1,800 
161 to 225 400,000 200,000 20,000 100,000 1,000 
226 to 250 90,000 50,000 5,000 30,000 200 
251 to 300 100,000 90,000 10,000 10,000 300 
301 to 350 80,000 80,000 5,000 0 200 
351 to 400 60,000 60,000 5,000 0 100 
401 to 500 70,000 60,000 8,000 0 90 
501 to 600 50,000 40,000 6,000 0 30 
>600 100,000 90,000 10,000 0 0 
Taxes from Increased Wages 
 
70 
Total 1,500,000 1,000,000 100,000 400,000 3,600 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding. 
 
Table XI:  Change in Health Spending under the Building Block Plans 
Variation 3 
 
 Change in  
Health 
Spending 
(Millions) 
Net Change in Spending 1,600 
 
 
 
                                                 
b
 We assume that there are no limits on the supply of providers under the public plan. 
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Market-Based Plan 
 
The market-based plan includes several components:  two options for deregulating insurance 
markets, enabling new products to be sold, and making better use of existing tax subsidies.   
 
The proposal includes two options for reducing the impact of community rating in the New York 
State market.  Option one, repealing community rating laws in the New York State non-group 
market, would result in a coverage shift among the uninsured of various health statuses.  Persons 
who are relatively healthy would see an increase in coverage, while coverage would decline 
among older, sicker people.  Overall we estimate that a net of approximately 60,000 people—
primarily those who reported “excellent” or “very good” health status—would gain coverage due 
to lower costs associated with repeal of community rating.     
 
Alternately, New York State could establish a high-risk pool at a premium of 150% of the non-
group premium (assuming no community rating, the average premium would be $4,500 per 
person).  This high-risk pool would insure approximately 9,000 currently uninsured people.  In 
addition, we estimate that 40,000 individuals currently enrolled in the non-group market would 
take up coverage in this high-risk pool.  In conjunction with the establishment of the high-risk 
pool, low risk purchasers could buy experience rated coverage.  We estimate that this will insure 
an additional 20,000 lower risk uninsured in non-group coverage.   The cost to New York State 
for covering persons in this high-risk pool would be $160 million ($2,900 per individual in the 
pool).  In the Manhattan Institute proposal, the pool would be funded by a tax on individuals 
with private insurance coverage.  We modeled the coverage effects of the tax on the non-group 
and small-group market only (because of ERISA)c.  We estimate each member of this population 
would have to pay an addition $90 annually in order to offset the additional costs needed to 
provide coverage for the uninsured who would take up coverage under these high-risk pools.  We 
estimate this additional cost would reduce coverage in the non-group and small-group markets 
by approximately 10,000.  Thus, the net effect of the high-risk pool on overall coverage in New 
York State would be approximately 20,000.   Unlike the option of repealing community rating 
altogether, this option would not have the effect of skewing the mix of non-group insured 
populations toward healthier people. 
 
Eliminating New York State’s benefit mandates in the individual market would result in an 
increase in non-group coverage of approximately 30,000.  This estimate represents the increase 
in coverage by eliminating all benefit service mandates strictly in the individual market.  The 
original “Rx NY” proposal specified eliminating only needless mandates, yet as we did not have 
a way of identifying these, we estimated the effect of eliminating all service mandates.     
 
A requirement for employers to offer Section 125 Flexible Benefit Plans or cafeteria plans to 
employees would affect approximately 700,000 of those currently uninsured.  These plans allow 
employees to use their own pre-tax dollars to buy coverage with no employer contribution.  We 
estimate that 30,000 of the uninsured would take-up coverage if offered Section 125 plans, at a 
government cost of approximately $710 million due to lost tax revenues.  Of this lost revenue, 
$580 million would be borne by the federal government and $130 million by New York State.  
                                                 
c
 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is a federal law that sets minimum standards for 
most voluntarily established pension and health plans in private industry to provide protection for individuals in 
these plans.  Under this law, states may not regulate self insured health plans.  Such regulation includes the taxation 
of large groups.  (United States Department of Labor).  
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This cost includes the lost revenue from the approximately 3 million full-time working 
individuals who already hold employer coverage and do not have access to Section 125 plans 
who would take advantage of the favored tax benefits of the program once available.  
 
Finally, we estimate that allowing New York State to offer temporary insurance plans would 
insure an additional 20,000 persons.  As there is very little data available on take-up in such 
plans, we used similar take up rates as those observed in Florida’s short-term medical plans (see 
technical appendix).     
 
Overall, the market-based plan would result in approximately 100,000-130,000 uninsured 
persons gaining coverage at a cost to New York State of $130 million.  In Table XIII, we detail 
the total health expenditures associated with each component of the market-based proposal, 
along with the offset generated primarily by current spending among the uninsured who take up 
coverage through the plan.  It should be noted the costs of the newly insured individuals through 
the high-risk pool and the individuals already with employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) who take 
up Section 125 plans would not affect the change in net health spending under the proposal since 
the medical costs for those individuals would remain unchanged, but be financed by different 
stakeholders.  However, the reduction in spending that would arise from individuals in the small 
group and non-group markets dropping coverage as a result of the tax from the high-risk pool are 
included in this offset.  Using this methodology we found that overall health spending in New 
York State would increase by $280 - $440 million.   
 
Table XII: 
Cost and Coverage under the Market-Based Plan*  
 
Measure Newly Insured Total New 
York State 
Costs 
(Millions) 
Repeal Community Rating 60,000 $0 
 
High-Risk Pool 
   Newly Insured in Pool 
   Newly Insured in Non-Group Market 
   Insurance Drop (Due to Tax on  
      Privately Insured) 
 
9,000 
20,000 
(10,000) 
0 
Eliminate Benefit Mandates 30,000 0 
 
Section 125  
   Newly Insured 
 
30,000  
 
710 
    580 (Fed) 
     130 (State) 
Short-Term/Temporary Insurance 20,000 0 
Total  100,000 – 
130,000 a 
$130 (State) 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding. 
 a  We provide a range of estimates, as we assume that the repealing community rating and  high-risk pool 
components cannot be implemented simultaneously. 
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Table XIII:  Change in Health Spending Under the Market-Based Plan* 
 
 Change in 
Health 
Spending 
(Millions) 
Repeal Community Rating $200 
High-Risk Pool 30 
Eliminate Benefit Mandates 100 
Section 125 Plans 90 
Short Term / Temporary Insurance 50 
Net Change in Health Spending $280 – 
$440 a 
* Estimates may not sum due to rounding. 
a
  We provide a range of estimates, as we assume that the repealing community 
rating and high-risk pool components cannot be implemented simultaneously.  
 
Table XIV:  Cost Impact of All Five Options for New York State* 
 
Total 
Insured in New 
York State 
(Thousands) 
 
Newly Insured 
(Thousands) 
Additional  
Government Cost 
Per Newly Insured 
Net Cost Per Newly 
Insureda 
Single Payer 
19,000 2,600  $25,900b $2,200 
Building Block Variation 1  
Without Mandate 
17,000 500  $1,900 $1,700 
With Mandate 
18,600 2,100 $1,800 $2,300 
Building Block Variation 2  
Without Mandate 
17,100 700 $2,900 $1,600 
With Mandate 
18,700 2,300 $2,300 $2,300 
Building Block Variation 3 
17,400 1,000 $3,600 $1,600 
Market-Oriented 
16,500 – 16,600 100 - 130 $1,000 - $1,400 $2,900 - $3,200 
* Totals may not sum due to rounding. 
a  Derived as the net change in health spending due to implementation of the proposal divided by the newly insured   
(reduction in uninsured).  
b   A substantial portion of this cost would be offset by the recapture of employer and individual spending. 
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Discussion 
 
In this report, we have provided estimates of coverage and costs for five policy options aimed at 
expanding health coverage in New York State.  Our choice of policy options was based on our 
review of testimony at various public hearings as well as input by members of the NYSHealth 
Coverage Consortium. Thus, the options modeled here likely represent a realistic cross-section of 
some of the most popular approaches to reform in New York State ranging from those that rely 
solely on government coverage to those that are primarily market based.  We have applied the 
same cost and coverage estimates to each proposal and shared similar assumptions whenever 
feasible.  
 
The single payer approach would cover all New Yorkers through a State-administered 
comprehensive plan.  This approach attains the greatest level of coverage; it covers all of the 2.6 
million uninsured residents of the State.  It provides the most comprehensive benefits package, 
offering an improvement in the generosity of benefits to virtually all New Yorkers, including 
those who now hold private insurance or Medicare.  However, the plan shifts all the cost of 
covering both the newly insured and the previously privately insured entirely to the New York 
State government so that from a governmental perspective, the single payer approach would have 
the greatest public costs.  New York State would have to raise an additional $66.8 billion to 
finance the plan.  Almost all of this of this net cost, however, would be offset by reductions in 
spending by employers and individuals.  Moreover, this plan would realize the greatest savings 
in administrative expenses and uncompensated care costs.  While net health spending would rise 
because of an increase in utilization, a much higher fraction of costs would go to paying for 
health services rather than insurer or provider administrative expense. 
 
The market-based approach would expand coverage by making private health insurance markets 
more affordable.  This approach would insure between 100,000 and 130,000 of New York State’ 
uninsured population, the lowest gain among approaches modeled.  For many New Yorkers, 
coverage levels under this approach would be less generous than current levels and would 
include significant cost-sharing.  This option would impose the least cost burden to the New 
York State government, requiring only about $130 million in new government outlays per year.  
From a New York State perspective, this cost would be the lowest among approaches modeled.   
 
The three building block or incremental approaches we modeled consist of multiple incremental 
strategies to expand coverage.  Those building block models that do not include a mandate result 
in modest reductions in the uninsured, newly covering one million or fewer.  From a New York 
State government perspective, the costs are also modest, particularly for the first two options we 
modeled.    Without a mandate, option one (the least generous of the three in terms of 
government expansion and subsidies) covers nearly 500,000 people at a public cost of $1.0 
billion.  The most generous approach would cover twice as many, even without a mandate, but 
would also be more costly.  Adding a mandate to a building block approach could achieve nearly 
universal coverage, leaving fewer than half a million New Yorkers without insurance.  These 
options would be much more costly however.   
 
The results here provide a general overview of the coverage effects and cost implications for 
New York State associated with popular expansion proposals.  We made no attempt to assess the 
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distributional implications of the proposals or to project costs forward.  Our results suggest that 
any insurance expansion will involve tradeoffs between numbers covered and costs.  No single 
approach clearly dominates the others. 
 
The results are derived from a model based on national assumptions.  Our findings are intended 
to stimulate debate and discussion among policymakers and stakeholders who should use our 
results as a reference of the broad implications and tradeoffs among the various options and 
philosophies of expanding health insurance in New York State.  To this end, we provide a 
detailed description of all the methods used to arrive at these results, along with a list of all the 
parameters used and their sources in the technical appendix.  By providing such an open and 
transparent model, we expect that a healthy debate of our assumptions and parameters will ensue.  
This input will be critical in the next phases of our work where we will examine additional New 
York-specific considerations that need to be considered in future modeling.  We hope the process 
will also lead to furthering the engagement of New York State policymakers in the health reform 
process.    
 
We would encourage readers of our report to send us any comments.  Comments should be sent 
to Nicholas Tilipman at nt2232@columbia.edu. 
 
 Analysis of Five Health Insurance Expansion Options for New York State  
 
26 
Technical Appendix:  Estimating Assumptions and Methods 
 
Table XV lists all of the assumptions, parameters and sources that were used in the modeling 
analysis. 
Baseline Estimates and Uniform Assumptions 
 
Population Estimates:  We estimated coverage in New York State by age and poverty level 
using State-level data from the March supplement (Annual Social and Economic Study) of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS).  We combined CPS data for New York State for 2004, 2005, 
and 2006 to increase sample size and allow us to estimate the set of sub-populations by age, 
primary insurance coverage, etc.  We assigned people to health insurance units (HIUs) and 
assigned each individual to a source of primary insurance coverage (Medicare, Medicaid, Private 
Insurance, Uninsured), which we based on an insurance hierarchy.  For example, an individual 
who was enrolled in both Medicare and either Medicaid or private insurance during the year was 
placed into the ‘Medicare’ category. We did not adjust our Medicaid population estimates for the 
underreporting of Medicaid in CPS.13  
 
Figure 1 
Baseline Coverage In NYS 2004 (In Thousands)
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Source:  Annual March Social and Economic Study Supplement Current Population Survey, 2004-2006. 
 
Non-Group Population Adjustments:  The CPS grossly overstates New York State’s actual non-
group population.  Therefore we adjusted our estimates of current enrollment in individual 
coverage using estimates for 2006 that we obtained from the New York State Insurance 
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Department.d  The adjustments reduced the CPS non-group estimate by about 600,000.  We 
reassigned those excluded from non-group coverage to employer-sponsored insurance and 
Medicaid according to household income. 
 
State Health Expenditure Estimates: We obtained estimates of national per capita health 
expenditures in 2004 using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)’s Household 
Component and stratified spending by different population cells—age, gender, type of service, 
primary insurance coverage, and source of payment.  We adjusted the MEPS data by State-level 
health expenditure estimates from the 2004 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
National Health Accounts (the last year of cost data available at the State level).  This allowed us 
to obtain State-level expenditure estimates for New York.  Using these two datasets, we created 
adjustment factors for per-capita expenditures by type of service for Medicare payments and 
Medicaid payments.  We derived an adjustment factor for per capita non-Medicare, non-
Medicaid payments as well by subtracting these payments from each dataset and dividing by the 
total population.  We used this adjustment factor to inflate all private insurance expenditures, 
out-of-pocket expenditures, and other payments. 
 
As the CMS includes all types of health care services and supplies in the data (nursing home 
care, expenditures for non-durable medical products – i.e. over-the-counter, non-prescription 
medication, etc. – or other personal health care, such as housekeeping services, industrial in-
plant expenditures, etc.), we excluded these categories from our estimates by creating adjustment 
factors between the MEPS estimates and CMS estimates with those categories removed.  These 
data form our baseline for current health care spending in New York State.  
 
Figure II 
Health Spending in New York State in 2004 by Source of Payment 
All Services (In Millions)
Medicare
24,100
18%
Medicaid
37,100
28%
Private Insurance
47,700
35%
OOP
18,800
14%
Other Exp
6,800
5%
 
                                                 
d
 In 2006, there were approximately 62,000 people in New York State’s standardized direct pay market, and an 
additional 79,000 who held insurance through other non-group products.   
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Source:  Medical Expenditures Panel Survey, Household Component, 2004. 
Figure III 
Health Spending in New York State in 2004 by Source of Payment 
Without Nursing Home, Non-Durable Products, Other Personal Health Care 
(In Millions)
Medicare
22,700
20%
Medicaid
24,300
22%
Private Insurance
43,200
38%
OOP
16,800
15%
Other Exp
6,000
5%
 
Source:  Medical Expenditures Panel Survey, Household Component, 2004. 
 
Administrative Cost Estimates:  We calculated an administrative component for the Medicare 
program, Medicaid program, and private health insurance based on CMS estimates for national 
administrative/overhead expenses as a percentage of benefit payments for personal health care.  
In 2004, Medicare’s administrative costs were 3.5% of the program’s total payments for personal 
health care and Medicaid’s administrative costs were 7.5%.  We used national net costs of 
private health insurance (average premiums less benefit payments) as the administrative 
component of private insurance.  This amounted to approximately 15% of payments for personal 
health care services.  We assume that administrative costs for these insurance plans are similar in 
New York State14   
 
Individual Premiums for New York State’s Public Programs, Employer-Sponsored Insurance, 
and Non-Group Coverage:  For people enrolling in Family Health Plus, we used cost and 
coverage data for 2004 from the New York State Department of Health.  We used the Medicaid 
Prepaid Services Expenditure Reports and the Average Monthly Medicaid Beneficiaries reports 
in order to estimate the average annual expenditures per beneficiary for the Family Health Plus 
program.  This came to $3,54515      
   
For children enrolling in Child Health Plus, we used cost and coverage data from the Kaiser 
Family Foundation’s “StateHealthFacts.org.”  We used information on historical SCHIP 
spending for 2004 and the SCHIP monthly enrollment estimates in order to estimate total 
expenditures per enrollee for the year.  This came to $1,04016 
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For enrollees in Building Block 3, we used a weighted average of the FHP and CHP premium 
based on the number of uninsured children and adults eligible for the program.  This came to 
$3,190. 
 
In addition to public costs, we needed to estimate premiums in the private market in order to 
calculate the price change for those with access to employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) or non-
group coverage under buy-in and the insurance connector.   We estimated the average employee 
share of the ESI premium using data from the MEPS 2004 Insurance Component.  This came to 
approximately 20% of the full premium.17  For non-group prices, we assumed that individuals 
without an ESI offer whose household incomes were below 250% of the federal poverty level 
were eligible for coverage in the Healthy New York program.  For this population, we used the 
average monthly premium for Healthy NY from the Annual Report on the Healthy New York 
Program put out by the New York State Insurance Department ($1,908).18  For those with 
incomes above 250% FPL, we assigned a non-group premium based on the average HMO 
premiums for non-group coverage according to the New York State Insurance Department 
Premium Rates Index.19  As this figure was only available for the current year (2008), we 
deflated the average premium to 2004 dollars using CMS average growth rates.  We created a 
conversion factor between average growth rates in the United States and average rates in New 
York State between 2000 and 2004.  We applied this factor to projected national growth rates 
through the year 2008.  The full employer premium came to $3,391 and the individual, non-
group premium came to $8,178. 
 
These non-group figures are actual figures for New York State, assuming that its current 
community rating laws are in place.  For those proposals in which we assume no community 
rating (i.e. the high-risk pool in the “Rx NY” proposal), we apply Connecticut’s non-group 
premium ($3000), taken from American Health Insurance Plans.20  We do this since 
Connecticut’s market is relatively de-regulated and its average health costs are similar to New 
York State.   
  
Price Elasticity and Take-Up Rates:  Many studies have looked at how the number insured 
would respond to changes in price of health insurance (price elasticity), yet an overall consensus 
has not been reached.  For example, the Lewin Group’s analysis of a Family Health Plus Buy-In 
for New York State employed price elasticity estimates that ranged from -0.55 percent to -0.09 
percent, depending on an individual’s socio-economic characteristics (i.e. a one percent 
reduction in premiums would increase take up by 55 percent among those of lowest income 
levels, and of 9 percent among the highest income levels).21  The Employment Policies Institute, 
in its study of the Bush tax credits in 2007, used a lower average estimate of -0.1 for the price 
elasticity for demand of health insurance.22  We used price elasticity estimates of -0.3 for those 
individuals whose household incomes fell below 200% of the federal poverty level and -0.15 for 
those whose incomes were above 200% in order to estimate take-up of health insurance 
(specifically through the availability of a Family Health Plus Buy-In and take-up of non-group 
coverage due to price reductions).   
 
In order to estimate take-up by the uninsured, we converted these price elasticity estimates by 
multiplying them by the ratio of percentage of the privately insured potentially eligible to the 
percentage of the uninsured eligible for the given insurance.  This yielded a take-up elasticity for 
the uninsured that we applied to estimate new enrollment into the FHP buy-in, etc. by poverty 
level, using the estimated price changes.  Since there are fewer uninsured and more privately 
insured (especially through employer-sponsored insurance) at higher income levels than at lower 
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levels, our take-up elasticity estimates for those populations are high (these estimates along with 
substantial price reductions for health insurance would imply a 100% take-up rate among the 
uninsured at higher income levels).  We cap our take-up rates at 90%, assuming that some 
uninsured would remain uninsured despite the availability of cheaper coverage.    
 
Crowd-Out:  We assume that increases in eligibility of public programs to higher incomes would 
lead to an increased take-up among the privately insured.  This is known as crowd-out.  To 
measure crowd-out under each of the public program expansions as well as under public program 
buy-ins, we assumed that take-up elasticity among the population with employer-sponsored 
insurance was approximately 30% as high as it was for the uninsured.23  We assumed that take-
up among the non-group coverage population was 80%.  Using these figures, we calculated 
crowd-out rates by poverty level to represent the percentage of previously privately insured that 
would take up public coverage under the proposal. 
 
We assume that any reduction in employer-sponsored coverage through crowd-out would 
generate a corresponding increase wages and, hence, in taxes collected on wages.   
 
Single Payer Adjustments 
 
Coverage through the Single Payer Program: We assume that all residents of New York State 
would automatically be covered under the zero-premium, comprehensive single payer program. 
 
Reduction in Cost-Sharing:  Under the single-payer proposal, cost-sharing would be completely 
eliminated.  We estimate that this would lead to an increase in utilization of health services 
among those who pay significant out-of-pocket costs under the current system (most who have 
private insurance as their primary coverage).  In order to adjust for increased healthcare 
utilization due to a reduction in cost-sharing from an average of 25% to 0%, we inflate total 
spending for the privately insured population by 20.7% for children and 23.8% for adults, using 
the RAND estimates.24  These RAND estimates are slightly higher than those used by Lewin in 
the Lewin group’s analysis of a single payer program in California.25   
 
Utilization of the Uninsured:  We assume that per capita expenditures for the uninsured would 
rise to the same level of expenditures as the formerly privately insured population for each age 
group.  A recent study by the Urban Institute estimated that fully covering all the uninsured in 
the United States would increase their spending by $122 billion, or 5.1% of national health 
expenditures.26  Our estimate of $7.8 billion is slightly higher (approximately 7.6% of national 
health expenditures, excluding administration). This is due primarily to the increased generosity 
of the benefits in our model. Other estimates model utilization by extending current private 
coverage to the uninsured, which includes co-payments and deductibles.  In our model, the 
coverage that the previously uninsured would receive would not have any cost-sharing.e 
 
Utilization of the Medicare Population without supplemental insurance:  We estimate that 12% 
of the current Medicare population does not have supplemental private insurance, and faces full 
                                                 
e
 Had we calculated the change in spending for the uninsured by assigning them average per capita expenditures of 
current privately insured individuals (with cost-sharing), then our estimate for the increase in spending for the 
uninsured would be 5.1% of our baseline for national health expenditures – very similar to Urban Institute’s latest 
estimates.  
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Medicare cost-sharing.27 We inflated the health care costs of this population, assuming that a 
single-payer plan would be the equivalent to providing comprehensive supplemental insurance to 
the entire Medicare population.  We assumed that supplemental insurance increases Medicare 
expenditures by 6.7%28.  We also assumed the cost of the supplemental insurance would be equal 
to the average private insurance payments for the Medicare population also holding private 
insurance for all services (with the exception of those not covered by the single-payer).  We 
inflated the total costs to the Medicare population without supplemental insurance by assigning 
them the same expenditures as the full-year Medicare, privately insured population 
(approximately $4,300 per enrollee).  We assume that Federal maintenance of effort would only 
reflect current Medicare payments.    
 
Reduction in Insurer and Provider Administrative Costs and Uncompensated Care:  A single-
payer system would reduce insurance administrative expenses, as multiple and competing plans 
would be consolidated into one publicly financed and publicly administered mechanism.  In 
addition, the overhead expenses faced by providers—hospitals and physicians—would be 
diminished, as the costs associated with billing, budgets, and filing claims would be simplified.   
 
Insurance Administrative Costs:  Current studies vary in their assumptions about the effect of a 
state single payer plan on insurer administration.  Many analysts modeling single payer use 
Medicare’s administrative costs.  For example, the Lewin Group, in its analysis of implementing 
a single-payer plan in California, reduced administrative costs from 7.6% to 2.3%29  Ken Thorpe, 
in his analysis of Vermont, assumed an administrative cost rate of 3% of total insurance claims.30  
In this analysis, we assume a somewhat higher administrative cost rate under a single-payer 
system, 5%—one that falls between the Medicare program and the Medicaid program—
primarily because the challenges and  costs of enrolling the non-elderly population would be 
higher than for Medicare, which primarily enrolls the social security eligible population.  Our 
estimate is similar to that used by Mathematica Policy Research in their analysis of the feasibility 
of a single-payer system in Maine.31   
 
Provider Administrative Costs:  There is little consensus in existing literature on the appropriate 
reduction in provider administrative costs under a single payer plan.  In 1992, the Lewin Group 
estimated a reduction of approximately 14% for hospitals and approximately 26% for physicians. 
32
  These estimates were based on an analysis of physician administrative expenses as reported 
by the Medical Group Management Association (MGMA) surveys and an analysis of 
administrative expenses faced by California hospitals. In a more recent analysis of single payer 
in California (2005), Lewin used more generous estimates of 22% for hospitals and 30% for 
physicians’ offices.  Mathematica Policy Research Inc. used more conservative estimates of 15% 
each for Maine.  Ken Thorpe used estimates of 28% for hospitals and 26% for physicians.  In this 
analysis, we used a middle of the road estimate of a 25% reduction for hospital and physician 
administrative savings under a single-payer system.  We also assume that any administrative cost 
savings could be recouped entirely through reduced provider payments and reduce provider fees 
accordingly.      
 
Uncompensated Care:  We estimate current uncompensated care costs in New York State at 
$3.0 billion.     We derived this number using the MEPS 2004 Household Component for all full-
year and part-year uninsured.  As single payer would cover all residents of New York, we 
assumed that all uncompensated care cost payments would be eliminated under single payer 
coverage. 
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Building Block Plans (Variation 1 and Variation 2) 
 
Public Program Expansions (Child Health Plus and Family Health Plus):  For each of the 
public program expansions modeled under this scenario, we first estimated the population that is 
currently eligible for coverage based on New York State Medicaid eligibility rules.  For 
example, we assume that any child under the age of 19 whose household income falls beneath 
250% of the federal poverty level is eligible for Child Health Plus.  We assume that all adults 
between the ages of 19 and 64 with zero children in their households and whose household 
incomes were below the poverty level were eligible for Family Health Plus.  We assigned 
participation rates for each program by income group based on current enrollment by each 
population in the Medicaid program.  We then estimated the populations that become newly 
eligible for the programs due to the eligibility expansions and assigned the observed participation 
rates (based on the behavior of already eligible groups) to that population in order to estimate 
take-up in the programs.  We find participation rates for Child Health plus to be 80%, 
participation by childless adults for Family Health Plus to be 41% and participation by parents in 
Family Health Plus to be 60%.  
 
We assume that existing providers would take any number of new FHP and CHP enrollees at 
current payment rates.    
 
Family Health Plus Buy-In:  We assumed that all adults who did not have government-
sponsored insurance coverage and whose household incomes fell between 150 and 300% of the 
federal poverty level would be eligible for the buy-in.  The eligible population included all the 
uninsured adults, those with employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), and those holding individual 
(non-group) coverage.  Premium subsidies were assigned on a sliding-sliding scale basis 
according to the following distribution: 
 
Variation 1 (Blueprint Proposal) 
151 – 200% FPL:  80% subsidy 
201 – 250% FPL:  65% subsidy 
251 – 275% FPL:  50% subsidy 
276 – 300% FPL:  25% subsidy 
 
Variation 2 
201 – 250% FPL:  80% subsidy 
251 – 300% FPL:  60% subsidy 
301 – 400% FPL:  40% subsidy 
 
We separated uninsured adults eligible for the buy-in by who had an ESI offer and those without 
an offer.  We estimated the percentage of uninsured adults with an offer using the Household 
Component of the 2004 Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS).  We estimate that 
approximately 27% of the uninsured (including dependents and children) have an offer for 
employer-sponsored insurance and approximately 24% of adult uninsured (including 
dependents) have an offer.  Individuals with an offer of insurance would compare the individual 
buy-in to the employee share of the ESI premium in deciding whether to take up coverage 
through FHP.     
 
In order to estimate take-up of the buy-in by the uninsured, we used our estimates for take-up 
elasticity (derived from our uniform price elasticity estimates) and applied them, along with the 
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estimated change in price, to the uninsured population by income range.  Table XIV lists all our 
take up elasticity estimates for adults, children and overall by poverty level. 
 
There is little empirical evidence available that suggests that employers significantly drop 
coverage with the availability of new public programs, such as Medicaid.33  Therefore, we 
assume that only employers of firms with fewer than 10 employees would drop coverage with 
the availability of this buy-in or the public program eligibility expansions, although individual 
employees might drop coverage and switch to public.     
 
Insurance Connector:  We assumed that participation in the connector would reduce individual 
insurance premiums by 5% (a generous estimate) based on analysis of existing literature.34     
 
Individual Mandate:  Under the individual mandate, we assumed that 75% of these remaining 
uninsured after implementation of the public program expansions, the buy-in, and the insurance 
connector would enroll in the cheapest coverage available to them.  We used the same methods 
to approximate the number of uninsured adults with an ESI offer as we had done for the buy-in, 
and assumed that 75% of this population would accept the offers.  We assumed that of the 
remaining uninsured, all adults below 150% (200% under variation 2) of the federal poverty 
level would be eligible for Family Health Plus/Medicaid, all adults above 150% (200 under 
variation 2) FPL would become eligible for the buy-in, all children below 400% would be 
eligible for Child Health Plus/Medicaid, and children above 400% would be eligible only for 
individual or non-group coverage.  75% of each of these populations would take up the 
respective insurance that they would be eligible for under the mandate. 
  
Building Block Plan (Variation 3) 
 
Assumptions about Child Health Plus and Public Program Simplification:  In the analysis of 
their Cornerstone plan, the Community Service Society of New York State assumed that 
measures to simplify eligibility and enrollment procedures in New York State’s existing public 
programs (Family Health Plus and Child Health Plus) along with expansions of Child Health 
Plus eligibility levels to 400% FPL were already put into place.  Thus, their estimates did not 
include the costs and coverage of these populations.35  For our analysis, we assume that the Child 
Health Plus expansion had already occurred.      
 
Public Program Expansion:  We estimated take-up of the program using price elasticity 
estimates to derive take-up elasticity based on the estimated price change by income level.  We 
assumed that after the Child Health Plus expansions, all remaining uninsured children and adults, 
and all privately insured individuals up to 600% of the federal poverty level were eligible for 
public coverage with sliding scale premiums.  Premiums were assigned based on an individual’s 
household income according to the following distribution: 
 
Individual Coverage: 
0 – 160% FPL:  0% (Free) 
161 – 225% FPL:  1.4% 
226 – 250% FPL:  1.6% 
251 – 300% FPL:  2.4% 
301 – 350% FPL:  2.8% 
351 – 400% FPL:  3.5% 
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401 – 500% FPL:  4.3% 
501 – 600% FPL:  4.7% 
>600% FPL:  Full Premium 
 
Family Health Plus Employer Buy-In:  Unlike the first two variations of the Building Block 
options, the third variation offers employers the option of buying public coverage for their 
employees.  We assumed that all the working uninsured would be eligible for an employer buy-
in to public coverage.  Each individual would compare the full average ESI premium (employee 
and employer share) and the subsidized cost of coverage in the program (individual co-premium 
+ employer share).  We assume that employers would pay no more than 70% of the premium for 
coverage into the program.  In effect, this treats each worker as a firm with one employee, 
individually making the decision of whether or not to offer public coverage.  Hence, under the 
plan, buy-in occurs at the employer rather than the employee level.      
 
Market-Based Plan 
 
Repeal Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue Laws in the Non-Group Market:  We 
estimated the coverage impact of repealing all of New York State’s community rating laws in the 
individual market using existing estimates of the effect of non-group community rating on 
insurance coverage by age and health status.  We assumed that repealing community rating laws 
shift coverage from people who report having poor health to people who report having excellent 
health.  Among the uninsured in excellent health, coverage would increase by 2.5%.  However, 
the number of uninsured with poor health who enrolls would decrease by approximately 5.9%.36  
We used these estimates and the age/health-rated medical care costs for this group to create a 
distribution of percent change in coverage among the uninsured by age and health status 
(excellent, very good, good, fair and poor) as reported in our three-year CPS data.  The net 
increase in coverage is due primarily to take up by the uninsured with reported excellent health.      
 
Eliminate Benefit Mandates in the Non-Group Market:  We used State-level 2005 estimates of 
average increase in the cost of premiums due to benefit service mandates put out annually by the 
Council for Affordable Health Insurance (CAHI) in order to calculate the percentage of total 
insurance costs attributed to benefit mandates by state.37  In 2005, we assume that New York 
State’s benefit mandates accounted for approximately 20% of premium costs (assuming that 
policies would not have offered the mandated benefits prior to implementation of the mandate).   
 
We ran a linear regression using the CAHI data to adjust for the size of the relevant mandates, to 
find the effect of the cost of benefit mandates on non-group enrollment.  We controlled for the 
percentage of individuals that reported being self-employed and the percentage of people 
reporting having worked in the fishing, agricultural, forestry or hunting industries the previous 
year.  Based on our regression coefficient, which suggested that an increase in benefit mandate 
costs would actually generated a slight increase in non-group enrollment, we assume that a one 
percentage point increase in the cost of benefit mandates would lead to no more than a 0.01 
percentage point reduction in non-group coverage.  The original Manhattan Institute proposal 
suggested eliminating only needless mandates.  As we did not have a way to identify these, we 
modeled the effects of eliminating all service mandates.   
 
High-Risk Pool:  We derived estimates of medical care costs for the non-group and uninsured 
populations by age and health status.  We assumed that this population who had medical costs 
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greater than the average New York State non-group premium (in the absence of community 
rating) would be eligible for a high-risk pool.  We applied take up elasticity estimates to 
calculate the newly insured through the pool, assuming that each enrollee would have to pay 
150% of this premium in the pool ($4,500) and assumed that all eligible non-group enrollees 
would enter the pool, since they would be receiving equivalent care for a cheaper price.  We then 
estimated the population of New York State in the non-group market and small-group market 
(assumed to be people with employer-sponsored insurance or their dependents who work for 
firms with fewer than 100 employees) and charged these populations a tax to cover the 
population eligible for the high-risk pool.  A tax would not be charged to the privately insured in 
the large group market due to ERISA.  We then used the price elasticity in conjunction with the 
estimated price change for the non-group and small-group market in order to estimate the 
decrease in coverage due to the addition of the tax. 
 
We also offered the remaining uninsured population, i.e. those with lower medical costs and 
greater health statuses, a product in the non-group market.  The product would offer coverage at 
their age-rated medical costs plus the tax for those in the high-risk pool.        
 
Section 125 Plan:  We used data from the 2005 Employee Benefits Survey of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in order to estimate the percentage of workers who have access to Flexible 
Benefit (cafeteria) plans.  Currently, about 20% of all full-time workers have access to such 
plans.  Under the proposal, we assume that 75% of firms that do not offer would comply with a 
mandate to do so, similar to our assumption for the individual mandate in the building block 
proposals.   
 
We assumed that the workers with employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) who do not have access 
to these plans would be offered one under the proposal and that all offered would take up the 
plan.  We used an estimate for New York State’s marginal Federal and State tax rate to calculate 
the cost to the federal and state government, in effect treating the cafeteria plan as a tax credit or 
premium subsidy.   
 
We also assumed that the uninsured population with an offer of ESI and workers with no ESI 
offer would be eligible to take up coverage if a cafeteria plan were offered.  We modeled take-up 
using the estimated price changes for this population, the calculated Federal and State costs using 
the marginal tax rate estimates and the price elasticity assumptions detailed above. We assumed 
that the private insurance market would develop mechanisms to sell coverage through payroll 
deduction to non-offering employers with Section 125 plans.   
 
Temporary / Short-Term Insurance Coverage:  There is little public data available on the take 
up of temporary insurance.  We were unable to retrieve any such data from any state’s health 
commissioner, insurance department, or short-term insurance carriers.  Consequently, we used 
data from the 2007 Annual Report of the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, which 
contained data on enrollment in short-term medical insurance.38 We applied the Florida take-up 
rate, 0.1% of the population, to New York State.  As there was no data available on the 
composition of these enrollees, we distributed take-up proportionally among the non-group and 
uninsured populations.    
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Table XV:  Parameters Used In Modeling of Proposals 
 
Parameters Estimate Source 
Uniform 
Per Capita (enrollee) Health 
Expenditure Inflation factors for 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) by source of payment (for all 
services) to New York State 
      
     Medicare 
      
     Medicaid 
 
     Non-Medicare, Non-    
     Medicaid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.86 
 
4.77 
 
1.57 
Author’s estimates based on 
Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) 
National Health Accounts, 
2004. 
Per Capita (enrollee) Health 
Expenditure Inflation factors for 
MEPS by source of payment 
(excluding nursing home care, non-
durable medical products, and ‘other 
personal health care’) to New York 
State 
 
     Medicare 
 
     Medicaid 
 
     Non-Medicare, Non-   
     Medicaid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.75 
 
3.00 
 
1.40 
Author’s estimates based on 
CMS National Health 
Accounts, 2004. 
Payer Administrative Costs as a 
percentage of total personal health 
care benefit payments 
 
     Medicare 
 
     Medicaid 
 
     Private Insurance 
 
 
 
 
3.5% 
 
7.5% 
 
15.3% 
CMS 2004. 
Price Elasticity of Demand for Health 
Insurance 
 
   <200% FPL 
 
   >200% FPL 
 
 
 
-0.3 
 
-0.15 
 
 
 
Author’s estimates based on 
analysis of existing elasticity 
estimates. 
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Parameters Estimate Source 
Full Individual (Loaded) Average 
Premiums for Health Insurance 
 
   Family Health Plus 
 
 
   Child Health Plus 
 
 
   Cornerstone Coverage 
 
 
   Non-Group Coverage 
 
 
 
   Health NY Coverage 
 
 
 
 
   Average Employer-Sponsored  
   Insurance Premium 
 
      Employee Share (Total) 
 
 
 
$3,545 
 
 
$1,040 
 
 
$3,190 
 
 
$8,178 
 
 
 
$1,908 
 
 
 
 
$3,391 
 
 
$680 
 
 
 
 
New York State Department of 
Health. 
 
Kaiser Family Foundation, 
“State Health Facts”. 
 
Weighted Average of FHP and 
CHP Premium. 
 
New York State Insurance 
Department Premium Rates 
Index. 
 
New York State Insurance 
Department, 2006 Annual 
Report on the Healthy NY 
Program. 
 
MEPS 2004, Household 
Component, New York State. 
Percentage of Uninsured with an offer 
of insurance through their employer 
 
   Adults 
 
27% 
 
 
24% 
Author’s estimates based on 
analysis of MEPS 2004, 
Household Component. 
Crowd-Out Rate Assumptions 
 
   Previously Non-Group 
 
   Previously Employer-Sponsored               
 
 
80% Take Up 
 
Take-Up Elasticity 
30% as high as for 
uninsured 
 
 
 
 
Glied, Zivin, Remler, “Inside 
the Sausage Factory”. 
Overall Take Up Elasticity Estimates 
for Building Block Plans 
 
    0 – 150% FPL:     
   151 – 160% FPL:   
   161 – 200% FPL:    
   201 – 225% FPL:   
   226 – 250% FPL:   
   251 – 275% FPL:   
   276 – 300% FPL:   
 
 
 
0.27 
0.57 
0.75 
0.51 
0.55 
0.83 
0.99 
Author’s calculations.  Price 
elasticity estimates were 
multiplied by the ratio of 
privately insured to uninsured 
New Yorkers in each cell in 
order to calculate take-up 
elasticity.  Multiplying these 
take up elasticities by 
estimated price change for 
insurance at each levels 
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Parameters Estimate Source 
   301 – 350% FPL:   
   351 – 400% FPL:   
   401 – 500% FPL:   
   501 – 600% FPL:   
   >600% FPL:           
 
0.99 
1.19 
2.23 
2.41 
3.29 
yielded a take-up rate for the 
uninsured.  These elasticity 
estimates imply that a 10% 
reduction in the price of 
coverage would lead to a 5.7% 
increase in enrollment 
(between 151 and 160% FPL).   
 
At higher income levels, there 
are fewer uninsured persons 
and more with employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI), 
which led to greater elasticity 
estimates at these levels.  We 
cap all take-up rates at 90%--
that is, we assume that for 
coverage at a price of zero, no 
more than 90% of a population 
would voluntarily enroll.   
Adult Take Up Elasticity Estimates 
for Building Block Plans 
 
    0 – 150% FPL:     
   151 – 160% FPL:   
   161 – 200% FPL:    
   201 – 225% FPL:   
   226 – 250% FPL:   
   251 – 275% FPL:   
   276 – 300% FPL:   
   301 – 350% FPL:   
   351 – 400% FPL:   
   401 – 500% FPL:   
   501 – 600% FPL:   
   >600% FPL:           
 
 
 
 
0.21 
0.44 
0.58 
0.42 
0.45 
0.66 
0.82 
0.81 
1.04 
1.93 
2.05 
2.86 
Author’s calculations.  Price 
elasticity estimates were 
multiplied by the ratio of 
privately insured to uninsured 
New Yorkers in each cell in 
order to calculate take-up 
elasticity.  Multiplying these 
take up elasticities by 
estimated price change for 
insurance at each levels 
yielded a take-up rate for the 
uninsured.  These elasticity 
estimates imply that a 10% 
reduction in the price of 
coverage would lead to a 4.4% 
increase in enrollment 
(between 151 and 160% FPL).   
 
At higher income levels, there 
are fewer uninsured persons 
and more with ESI, which led 
to greater elasticity estimates 
at these levels.  We cap all 
take-up rates at 90%--that is, 
we assume that for coverage at 
a price of zero, no more than 
90% of a population would 
voluntarily enroll. 
Adult Take Up Elasticity Estimates  Author’s calculations.  Price 
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Parameters Estimate Source 
for Building Block Plans 
 
 
    0 – 150% FPL:     
   151 – 160% FPL:   
   161 – 200% FPL:    
   201 – 225% FPL:   
   226 – 250% FPL:   
   251 – 275% FPL:   
   276 – 300% FPL:   
   301 – 350% FPL:   
   351 – 400% FPL:   
   401 – 500% FPL:   
   501 – 600% FPL:   
   >600% FPL:           
 
 
 
 
0.50 
1.43 
1.58 
1.08 
1.30 
1.93 
1.77 
2.01 
1.86 
3.78 
5.08 
7.12 
elasticity estimates were 
multiplied by the ratio of 
privately insured to uninsured 
New Yorkers in each cell in 
order to calculate take-up 
elasticity.  Multiplying these 
take up elasticities by 
estimated price change for 
insurance at each levels 
yielded a take-up rate for the 
uninsured.  These elasticity 
estimates imply that a 10% 
reduction in the price of 
coverage would lead to a 5.0% 
increase in enrollment 
(between 0 and 150% FPL).   
 
At higher income levels, there 
are fewer uninsured persons 
and more with ESI, which led 
to greater elasticity estimates 
at these levels.  We cap all 
take-up rates at 90%--that is, 
we assume that for coverage at 
a price of zero, no more than 
90% of a population would 
voluntarily enroll. 
Single Payer Plan 
Single Payer Administrative Costs as 
a percentage of total personal health 
care benefit payments 
5% 
 
 
Estimate between Medicare 
and Medicaid administrative 
costs. 
Provider Administrative Costs as a 
percentage of expenditures 
 
   Hospital 
 
   Physician & Clinical 
 
 
 
33% 
 
31.6% 
Lewin Group, O Canada, Do 
We Expect Too Much…, 1992. 
Reduction in provider administrative 
costs due to single payer 
simplifications 
 
     Hospital 
 
     Physician and Clinical 
 
 
 
 
25% 
 
25%  
Assumption based on existing 
literature. 
Increase in total health care 
expenditures for the privately insured 
population due to a 25% reduction in 
cost-sharing 
 
 
 
 
RAND Health Insurance 
experiment.  Free-for-All, pg. 
48. 
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Parameters Estimate Source 
 
     Children (0 – 18) 
 
     Adults (19+) 
 
20.7% 
 
23.8% 
Percent of Medicare population 
without supplemental insurance 
12% Kaiser Family Foundation, 
Medicare Chartbook, 2002. 
Increase in Medicare expenditures 
due to an increase in utilization by 
Medicare population without 
supplemental insurance. 
6.7% Adam Atherly, The Effect of 
Medicare Supplemental 
Insurance on Medicare 
expenditures, 2002. 
Building Block Plans 
Participation Rates for Existing 
Public Programs 
 
   Family Health Plus 
 
     Childless Adults 
 
      Parents 
 
   Child Health Plus 
 
 
 
 
 
41% 
 
60% 
 
80% 
Author’s estimates based on 
Current Population Survey 
2004 – 2006. 
Take Up Rates for Individual 
Mandate 
75% 
 
 
Assumption 
Non-Group Premium Reduction due 
to Implementation of an Insurance 
Connector 
5% Assumption 
Percentage of Remaining Premium 
Cost Paid for by Employer after 
Employee Share (Employer Buy-In 
Option) 
< 70% of full 
premium 
Community Service Society, 
Cornerstone for Coverage, 
2007. 
Market-Based Plan 
Average Percent Change of 
Uninsured Due to Repealing 
Community Rating Laws 
 
   Excellent Health 
 
   Poor Health 
 
 
 
 
+2.5% 
 
-5.9% 
Lo Sasso, Lurie, Community 
Rating and the Market for 
Non-Group Health Insurance, 
2007. 
Percentage of Insurance Costs 
Attributed to Benefit Mandates 
20% Author’s estimates based on 
data from the Council for 
Affordable Health Insurance, 
Health Insurance Mandates in 
the States, 2005. 
Percentage Point Change in Non-
Group Insurance Due to a Percentage 
Point Increase in Benefit Mandate 
Costs 
-0.01 Author’s estimates based on 
data from the Council for 
Affordable Health Insurance, 
Health Insurance Mandates in 
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Parameters Estimate Source 
 
   
the States, 2005 and 
regression. 
 
Our regression result indicated 
a slightly positive coefficient.  
We therefore assume a modest 
effect of benefit mandates on 
non-group enrollment of 0.01 
percentage points.  (a 1 
percentage point increase in 
benefit mandate costs lead to a 
0.01 percentage point decrease 
in non-group coverage). 
Percentage of Workers (Full-Time) 
with access to Flexible Benefit 
(cafeteria) Plans 
20% Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Employee Benefit Survey, 
2005. 
New York State Marginal Tax Rates 
 
   Federal 
    
   State 
 
  Social Security 
 
 
19% 
 
6% 
 
14% 
Author’s estimates based on 
National Bureau of Economic 
Research Average Marginal 
Income Tax Rates since 1977.  
We used ½ of the Social 
Security marginal tax rate in 
our calculations, as the 
employer bears half this cost. 
Take Up Elasticity Estimates for 
Section 125 Plans (by Poverty Level) 
 
   <100% FPL     
   100 – 199% FPL 
   200 – 299% FPL:    
   300 – 399% FPL:   
   >400% FPL: 
 
 
 
0.04 
0.06 
0.06 
0.15 
0.49 
Author’s calculations.  Price 
elasticity estimates were 
multiplied by the ratio of full-
time working insured with no 
ESI offer to the working 
uninsured with no offer in 
order to calculate take-up 
elasticity.  Multiplying these 
take up elasticities by 
estimated price change for 
insurance at each levels 
yielded a take-up rate for the 
uninsured.  These elasticity 
estimates imply that a 10% 
reduction in the price of 
coverage would lead to a 0.6% 
increase in enrollment 
(between 200 and 299% FPL).   
Take Up Elasticity Estimates for 
High-Risk Pool (By Age) 
 
   0 – 18 
   19 – 24 
   25 - 34 
 
 
 
0.07 
0.01 
0.02 
Author’s calculations.  Price 
elasticity estimates were 
multiplied by the ratio of 
people with non-group 
coverage to the uninsured 
eligible for the pool.  We 
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Parameters Estimate Source 
   35 – 44 
   45 – 54 
   55 - 64 
    
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
 
calculated elasticities for the 
pool by age as an individual’s 
medical costs and eligibility 
for the pool were dependent on 
age and health status. 
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Table XVI:  Review of Previously Published Estimates for 
"Building Block" and "Cornerstone" Proposals for New York State 
 
 
Paper Reforms Modeled 
Eligible 
Population 
Newly 
Insured 
Crowd-
Out* Costs 
"Building Block" Reform  
 
United Hospital Fund 
and  
The Commonwealth 
Fund, “A Blueprint 
for Universal Health 
Insurance Coverage 
in New York” 
(2006). 
 
1) Public Program 
Streamlining and 
Simplification 
 
2) Family Health Plus 
Expansion for 
Childless Adults 
 
3) Family Health Plus 
Buy-In / Insurance 
Connector with 
Premium Subsidies 
 
4) Employer 
Assessment / Pay-or-
Play 
 
5) Individual  
Mandate 
 
 
1) Childless adults 
under 150% FPL 
 
2) Individuals with 
incomes between 
150% and 300% 
FPL 
 
3) Employers with 
10 or more workers 
 
4) All remaining 
uninsured 
(individual 
mandate) 
 
840,000  
(without  
mandate) 
 
2.4 million 
(with  
employer and 
individual 
mandate) 
 
1.7  
million 
(without 
mandate) 
 
1.3  
million 
(with 
modest 
assessment 
for 
employers 
and 
mandate) 
 
600,000 
(with pay-
or-play and 
mandate) 
 
Without 
Mandate 
Net: $1.7 
billion 
State: $4.8 
billion 
With 
Mandate 
(modest 
assessment 
scenario) 
Net:  $4.1 
billion 
State: $5.5 
billion 
With  
Mandate 
(pay-or-
play 
 scenario) 
Net: $4.1  
billion 
State: $4.0 
billion 
 
Our Results 
 
1) Child Health Plus 
Expansion 
 
2) Family Health Plus 
Expansion 
 
3) Family Health Plus 
Buy-In 
 
4) Insurance 
Connector 
 
5) Individual 
Mandate 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Children under 
400% FPL 
 
2) Childless adults 
Below 150% FPL 
 
3) Adults between 
150 and 300% FPL 
 
4) Remaining 
Uninsured 
(Mandate) 
 
500,000  
(without  
mandate) 
 
2.1 million 
(with 
mandate) 
 
300,000 
(without 
mandate) 
 
300,000 
(with  
mandate) 
 
Without 
Mandate 
Net: $900 
million 
 
State: $1.0 
billion 
 
With  
Mandate 
Net: $5.0 
billion 
 
State: $4.0 
billion 
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Paper Reforms Modeled 
Eligible 
Population 
Newly 
Insured 
Crowd-
Out* Costs 
"Cornerstone" Reform 
 
Community  
Service Society, 
"Cornerstone for 
Coverage" (2007). 
 
1)  Universal  
access to FHP/CHP 
Public Program 
 
2) Employer Buy-In 
 
All residents of 
New York State 
 
888,000 
 
914,000 
 
State  $4.4 
billion 
 
Our Results 
 
1) Child Health Plus 
Expansion 
 
2) Universal access to 
FHP/CHP Public 
Programs 
 
3) Employer Buy-In 
 
 
1) Children under 
400% FPL 
 
2) All residents of 
New York State 
 
1.0 million 
 
500,000 
 
Net  $1.6 
billion 
 
State  $3.6 
billion 
* Our crowd-out estimates vary significantly from the United Hospital Fund and The Commonwealth Fund 
“Blueprint” study, as we do not model an employer buy-in or assume that most employers would drop insurance 
coverage with the availability of Family Health Plus at higher eligibility levels.  In addition, we do not model public 
program simplification or streamlining measures.   
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